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Abstract
This article aims at delineating Kant’s theory of  understanding that integrate
subject and object at the transcendent level. Transcendental here refers to the
process of  thinking in such a way that ‘transcends’ natural thinking. It is called
transcendent for it occupied not so much with objects, but much about a
metaphysical solution on how the object related to the subject. It starts with
transcendental deduction by relating the objective with the subjective knowledge.
Here he excludes transcendental deduction from the discussion of the empirical
deduction. Afterward he differentiates the metaphysical deduction from
transcendental deduction, in which he identifies transcendental deduction as the
explanation of the way in which a priori concept can relate to object. The most
important concept in Transcendental deduction is that of  apperception. The
analysis of this concept involve two abilities that later become two important
steps: First ability of apprehending (reproducing and recognizing) knowledge
of  empirical truths. Second, ability of  apprehending (reproducing and
recognizing) knowledge of a non-empirical kind. Thus the general feature is
the view that knowledge involve essentially the ability to judge (synthesize or
combine) and the move from what is true empirically of our knowledge to
what is true transcendentally. This is spontaneous act of  mind and is called pure
apperception or original apperception, while the principle that governs the unity
of  consciousness is entitled the Transcendental Unity of  Apperception.
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Transcendental Truth
*Kampus Pusat UNIDA, Jl. Raya Siman Km. 06, Siman, Ponorogo Jawa Timur, Telp:




Makalah ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan teori Kant tentang pemahaman
yang mengintegrasikan subjek dan objek pada tingkat transenden. Yang dimaksud
transendental di sini merujuk kepada proses berfikir yang mentransendensikan
berfikir alami. Disebut transendent karena proses ini tidak banyak membicarakan
objek, tapi lebih banyak tentang solusi metafisis tentang bagaimana objek
berkaitan dengan subyek. Ini dimulai dari deduksi transendental dengan
mengkaitkan pengetahuan objektif dengan pengetahuan subyektif. Di sini ia
mengesampingkan deduksi transenden dari diskusi tentang deduksi empiris.
Setelah itu ia membedakan deduksi metafisik dari deduksi transendental, di
mana ia mengidentifikasi deduksi transendental sebagai penjelasan tentang cara
dimana konsep a priori dapat berkaitan dengan objek. Konsep terpenting dalam
deduksi transenden adalah konsep apersepsi. Analisa konsep ini melibatkan dua
kemampuan yang kemudian menjadi dua langkah penting: pertama, kemampuan
memahami (mereproduksi dan mengenal) pengetahuan tentang kebenaran
empiris. Kedua, kemampuan memahami (mereproduksi dan mengenal) jenis
pengetahuan yang non-empiris. Jadi gambaran umumnya adalah pandangan-
pandangan bahwa pengetahuan itu melibatkan secara mendasar kemampuan
menyimpulkan (sintesis atau mencampur) dan memindahkannya dari
pengetahuan kita yang benar secara empiris menjadi benar secara transenden.
Ini adalah kerja otak kita yang spontan dan ini disebut appersepsi murni atau
appersepsi asli sedangkan prinsip yang mengatur kesatuan kesadaran itu disebut
Kesatuan Transenden Apersepsi.




ant is known as a philosopher who integrate the rationalism
and empiricism. Kant’s idea of apperception is something to
do with the power of understanding and renders one of the
most important part of his epistemology. The idea, in general, is an
attempt to solve the problem how things that are object-related can
be possibly fit together with those that are subject-related. In more
specific notion the theory tries to clarify how our concepts refer to
items in reality or how our inner thought and judgment can be
objectively true of the external world. The current discussion will
try to examine the extent to which the idea of transcendental unity
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of apperception can satisfactorily solve the problem. In order to grasp
the complete argument of Kant’s program to maintain the
inseparability of the subject-object related phenomena we shall, at
the outset, trace directly his concept of transcendental deduction.
Transcendental Deduction
In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason the transcendental unity of
apperception is placed under the chapter “The deduction of the Pure
Concept of Understanding”, but Kant presents its detail exposition
from the principle of transcendental deduction and the a priori
grounds of the possibility of experience. These two sections of Critique
are complex expositionswhich aimed at justifying the validity of our
empirical knowledge and it seems to be the core of Kant’s Critique
and the foundation of his whole critical edifice.
Kant calls the transcendental deduction “Analytic of Concepts”
that deals with the a priori concepts where the understanding uses
to construct experience together with the a priori forms of our
sensible intuition (space and time). These a priori concepts is named
“categories”. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show
that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid,
or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience.
Therefore, according to Kant the categories are necessary conditions
of experience, or that we could not have experience without the
categories. To clrify further the meaning of Deduction Kant exemplifies
it in terms of legal action. Usually jurist questions what is right (quid
juris) and not what is the fact (quid facti). Here the concept of
understanding with regard to quid facti is the result of the experience
where the employment of a priori concept or categories is necessary,
while various concepts which form a highly complicated human
knowledge come out of a priori employment independent from
experience. Karl Jasper interprets what is meant by deduction in
Kant’s views refers to the grounding of the objective validity of a
priori concepts.1 Unlike Karl, Coupleston and Justus Hartnack are in
the same opinion that deduction is justification, in the sense that it is
not a question about how extensively we actually employ categories,
1Karl Jaspers, Kant, Edited by Hannah Arendt, Tran. Ralph Manheim, Harcout, (New
York: Brace &World, Inc., 1957), 35.
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but a question of whether our use of categories is legitimate.2 In
other words deduction is concerning the justification of the application
of categories by showing that they are a priori condition of all
experience.
Transcendental refers to the process of thinking in such a way
that ‘transcends’ natural thinking. Although it is nothing to do with
the old metaphysical sense of “transcendence” which is to arrive at
pure being or God, it is in some ways similar process. Kant transcends
objective thinking seeking to arrive at the condition of all objectivity.
This is no longer metaphysical knowledge of supersensible object
but knowledge of the origin of our knowledge. Instead of seeking
the origin of all things he seeks the origin of the subject-object
dichotomy. The final result, therefore, is not an object to be known
as in metaphysics, but an awareness of the limits of our knowledge.
Kant’s explanation of the term is clear, as he says: “I entitle transcen-
dental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with
the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as the mode of knowledge is
to be possible a priori”.3 David Bell’s conclusion is true for he regards
that Kant’s epistemology is a metaphysical solution on how the object-
related and subject-related phenomena must be taken to be mutually
dependent and ultimately inseparable.4 Kant entitles the way in which
a priori concept can be related to object as transcendental deduction.5
From the above understanding of transcendental and deduction,
it is clear that what is meant by transcendental deduction is not
concerned with matters of empirical facts, but with the justification
of validity of concepts attained from that empirical facts. Therefore,
within transcendental deduction Kant differentiates between an
objective deduction - whose purpose is to explain the validity of a
prioriconcepts, especially on the possibility of understanding without
experience - and on the ability of cognitive power or the faculty of
thinking. The main point is, in fact, that Kant wants to relate the
objective with the subjective knowledge, for Kant has said in his
2 JustusHartnack, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, (London: Macmillan, 1968), 47. See
also: Frederick Copleston S.J., A History of Philosophy, Volume VI, (London: Search Press,
1977), 252.
3 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Unabridged
Edition, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965),  B 25, hereafter cited as CPR.
4David Bell, “Kant”, in Nicholas Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James, The Blackwell Companion
to Philosophy, (London: Blackwell, 1996), 591.
5Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 84.
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preface of second edition of his Critique that “all our knowledge must
conform to objects”.6
Transcendental knowledge is of a special kind and is neither
classified under a priori knowledge of a mathematical kind nor
everyday empirical knowledge. This is nothing to do with or telling
nothing about objects in the accepted ordinary or scientific ways,
but only about the kind, status or limits of such ordinary or scientific
knowledge. The term might be well understood in his further passage,
where Kant explains the meaning of transcendental exposition. To him
transcendental exposition is the explanation of concept as a principle
from which the possibility of other a priori synthetic knowledge can
be understood. It is called transcendental because partly it is
designated to explain or to indicate the possibility of a priori
knowledge.7 It is clear that there are not two identifiable syntheses
or types of consciousness, but only two ways of talking about
synthesis of consciousness and these two are empirical or
transcendental. In the case of pure concept of understanding the only
kind of deduction of pure a priori knowledge is on transcendental
level.8 and therefore the need of transcendental deduction is
unavoidable.
Moreover, the understanding of transcendental deduction can
be absorbed from the steps taken by Kant in verifying its
characteristic. First, he excludes transcendental deduction from the
discussion of the empirical deduction, for the latter indicates that
representation exists as reaction of the mind to external things. Then
he differentiates the metaphysical deduction from transcendental
deduction, in which he identifies transcendental deduction as the
explanation of the way in which a priori concept can be related to
object. In other words transcendental deduction is that which deals
with relation between subject and object in so intricate a way that
the unintelligible character of the whole seem to stand out as the
6Ibid., B xvi.
7Ibid., B 25, 40, 80-81; Kemp Smith explains the distinction between the term
transcendent and transcendental of Kant’s Critique. The former is that which lies entirely
beyond experience, whereas the latter signifies those a priori elements which underlie
experience as its necessary condition. The transcendent is always unknowable, but the
transcendental is that which conditioning experience render all knowledge, whether a
priori or empirical, possible. See, Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary, Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason, (New Jerssey: Humanities, 1984), 75.




However, there is an important point worth noting regarding
the transcendental deduction. Since transcendental deduction deal
with subject-object relation, it analyzes whether the object conceived
in transcendental deduction can be explained as a concept that
objectively valid as a concept or it still has to be verfied further.10
Kant, while excluding metaphysical deduction, explains that in
transcendental deducation we have to examine what it is to be
objectively valid, what kind of concept of a category is and why
there have to be categories of one sort or another. In this process
Kant reminds us that in Transcendental Deduction we must have
categories, but not that of metaphysical categories that we do have.
In order to elaborate further about Kant’s analysis of the objective
validity and categories we shall turn our discussion into his concept
of apperception, which concerns the notion of a personal and a
conceptual unity.
The Transcendental Apperception
Many had assumed that the concept of apperception was
introduced for the first time into more technical philosophical
tradition by Leibniz,11 who distinguished between perception and
apperception. However, Kant has considerably extended the function
of apperception in many respects and has developed it and makes
the distinction between empirical apperception or self-consciousness
and transcendental apperception or the a priori unity of consciousness.
While in Leibniz it is simply reflective consciousness rather than mere
passive perception, in Kant, it is consciousness of oneself as a unity
on both empirical or transcendental level.12 In connection with
Leibniz, C.D. Broad noted two significant points: first, that Kant
maintains Leibniz’s term to denote a form of purely intellectual
cognition, but denies that it is acquaintance with particular existents.
Second, Kant introduces another faculty of internal sense which
9 Karl Jaspers, Kant, 33.
10 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 128.
11 See C.D.Broad, Kant, An Introduction, Edited by C.Lewy, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978), 240; Robert Ulich, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edited by Paul
Edwards (et.al), (New York: Macmillan, Publishing Co & The Free Press, 1967), 138. See
also: Anthony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1979), 16.
12 Lacey, A.R., A Dictionary of Philosophy, (London, Routledge, 1976), 9.
Transcendental Unity of Apperception in Kant’s Theory of Knowledge 53
Vol. 10, No. 1,  Mei 2014
Leibniz never has in mind.13 In general we may infer that Kant’s
concept of apperception is marked by his attempt to build a unity of
empirical and transcendental apperception. It is by introducing a
faculty of inner sense with a mysterious power that make judging
possible and that is the faculty of making one’s own representation
of the object of one’s thought.
It has been suggested above that the concept of apperception is
the most important analysis in the transcendental deduction where
the concept of objective validity and a conceptual unity is to be found.
As Kant deals with the problem in a slightly different pattern between
the first and the second edition of his Critique, we shall follow here
their general feature. Kant’s analysis of the concept can be divided
into two steps: First, it is supposed that the ability to apprehend
(reproduce and recognize) is required for knowledge of empirical
truths. It is concerning the empirical operation, where the term
‘apprehension’, ‘reproduction’ and ‘recognition’ are elaborated. In
this operation the person’s awareness of himself depends on the
changing condition of his consciousness. Second, it is supposed that
such ability is required also for knowledge even of a non-empirical
kind. The term apperception is introduced to stand for a complex
condition governing the transcendental operation of these abilities.
In this step Kant shows his claim on the persistent inference from
empirical to transcendental.14 Thus the general feature is the view
that knowledge involves essentially the ability to judge (synthesize
or combine) and the move from what is true empirically of our
knowledge to what is true transcendentally.
The argument of the two steps be discerned from A 100, A 102
and B 135, and can be briefly summarized as follows. In his exposition
the shift from empirical to non-empirical account is clear. Kant
departs from the mental ability of empirical operation to arrive at a
priori synthesis of representation. Kant holds that the accumulation
of representations finally becomes associated, and apprehension is
the major synthesis that involves the ability to reproduce (remember)
and recognize (identify) what we perceive. However, reproduction
must follow certain rules, without which our empirical imagination
cannot exercise its appropriate power of knowing. The rule for the
13 C.D. Broad, Kant, An Introduction, 241.
14 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 106-107.
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reproduction is a priori ground of a necessary “synthetic unity of
appearance” or synthetic unity of representation. This synthesis is
grounded in antecedently upon a priori principle. Here, the synthesis
of apprehension is inseparable from synthesis of reproduction. Since
the former constitute transcendental ground of the possibility of all
mode of knowledge, the reproductive synthesis of the imagination
is to be counted among the transcendental act of the mind.15 We
have mentioned already that the ability to apprehend (reproduce
and recognize) is required for knowledge of empirical truths, but
from the above argument it is clear that these abilities indispensable
from and even required for knowledge of a non-empirical kind. Here
the a priori synthetic principles is the governing rule that unites the
two world, empirical and transcendental.
However, Graham Bird criticizes that in his transition Kant has
ambiguously used the term non-empirical, for it indicates the move
from empirical to both transcendental inquiry and a priorisynthesis.16
He exemplifies that it would be like arguing that since, in order to
make a cake, a mixing of ingredients is necessary, there must be
somehow, a necessary that is non-empirical or a priori mixing, over
and above conventional procedure. However, if we look at B 120-
121, it suggests that Kant does not argue for the existence of a priori
knowledge or synthesis, but rather presupposing that there is such
knowledge, and arguing that it must involve abilities of the kind
contained in apprehension. In other words, based on his examination
of empirical apprehension Kant concludes that there is an a priori or
non-empirical synthesis. Thus, the term non-empirical should be
understood as the process of transcendental inquiry into the general
condition of all our knowledge.17
What we have just elaborated above is Kant’s introduction of
apperception in his preliminary exposition of the deduction. The term
apperception is elucidated through the notions of consciousness and
personal identity as well as through objective judgment and
conceptual rules. In this introduction the concept is not clearly
established, for he is not so clear in distinguishing, for example,
between consciousness and concept. He says:”The concept of
15 Ibid., A 100-102.
16 Graham Bird, Kant Theory of Knowledge, (London: Routledge& Paul Kegan, 1962),
119.
17 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 401-402.
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number is nothing but the consciousness of this unity of synthesis”.18
In his elaboration of “the synthesis of recognition in a concept”19 he
expounds not only the function of concept but also the notion of
self-consciousness. Thus, apperception is like an anchorage where
all notion such as consciousness, personal identity, concept and
objective judgment are gathered. The argument leading to the need
of transcendental apperception is as follows. The relation of our thought
to object carries the element of necessary a priori and they must
posses unity that constitute the concept of an object. The unity that
make object necessary is nothing else than the formal unity of
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representation. The
unity is possible only if the intuition can be generated according to
rule, by which reproduction of the manifold become a priori necessary
and render possible concept. Finally, Kant arrivesat his notion of on
the necessity of transcendental apperception. He says that all necessity
is grounded in a transcendental “transcendental ground”, and this
is the transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the
synthesis of the manifold of all of our intuition20 without this ground
thinking any object for our intuition is impossible. He then proceeds
further that the only available candidate for such ground is
transcendental apperception.21
Transcendental Unity of Apperception
Kant considers that a synthesis as an established fact exists as
the result of the activity of understanding or as the result of the use
of concept. From this fact Kant proceeds to the transcendental unity
of apperception. The line of argument can be discerned as follows.
Our senses present us with a multiplicity of different sensation or in
Kant’s terminology “the manifold of representation” or sense
impression,but the intrinsic nature of these representations has no
permanent, stability, determinacy, objectivity or conceptual
articulation. Since sense experience is a manifold of various sense
impression which are unconnected, while our awareness is to be an
awareness of an intelligible, containing determinate, stable objects
18 Ibid., A 103.
19 Ibid., A 103-106.
20 Ibid., A 104-106.
21 Ibid., A 106-107.
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that persist through their changes and interact causally with one
another, then we must be capable of unifying or combining this
manifold. The combination cannot come through sense, and the act
of combining sense impression into unity as an act of understanding
is called synthesis.22 Moreover, Kant claims that without such
synthesizing activities we could have no awareness of external world.
This synthesis cannot be learned through experience for it must be
governed by rules. The governing rules are a priori rule and the most
fundamental of all a priori rule is that which enable different mental
states to be referred to one and the same object. However, if plurality
of mental states and mental content are all belong to one single unified
consciousness and if all mental states to be my state and content of
consciousness, an inescapable condition must be met and that
necessary condition is that mind should possess self-consciousness.
In the section The Original synthetic Unity of Apperception Kant
explains that:
It must be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representation:
That representationwhich can be given prior to all thought is entitled
intuition. All the manifold of intuition has,therefore, a necessary relation
to the “I think” in the same subject in which this manifold isfound”. 23
The quotation suggests the attempt to postulate the unity of
self-consciousness. We need, therefore, to analyze in detail. In the
terminology of the Critique, representation is the generic name for
all mental contents, including categories, empirical concept, ideas,
pure intuitions and perception. Kant explicit definition is to be found
in The Critique24 as “inner determination of our mind in this or that
relation of time.” Or it may be understood as merely the contents of
our consciousness and the immediate object of awareness. Ronno
Gennaro, who accuses Kant of being ambiguous, grasps the term
representation as either ‘mental state’ or as ‘conscious mental state’.25
In fact, the representation is divided into representation with or
without consciousness, but Kant is only interested in the conscious
representation that include all the elements of his account of
22 Ibid., B 130.
23 Ibid,. B 131-132.
24 Ibid,. A 197, B 242
25 Rocco J. Gennaro, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, (Amsterdam: John
Benjamin Publishing Company, 1995), 49.
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knowledge and experience. The representations with consciousness
are entitled perception, and these are divided into sensation, or those
which related solely to the subject of that state and objective
perceptions or cognition. Furthermore, the objective perception is
divided into intuition and concept. The former relates to immediately
to a single object, while the latter refers to it mediately through
common feature of several thing.26 Both the intuition and concept
are produced in a spontaneous act, but intuition is given prior to all
thought. While intuition provide a field within which the manifold
of intuition may appear as a representation, the concept synthesizes
these representation into experience and knowledge. The application
of a concept to an intuition in judgment is nothing other than the
‘representation of representation’ of an object. Therefore, all repre-
sentation have, as representations, their object and can themselves
in turn become object of other representation.27 The sentence implies
that in order to treat representation as mental contents, we must
make judgments about them by mean of other representations.
Now the term “I think” is subject to various interpretations.
Justus Hartnack understand the term as not identical with empirical
self-consciousness. It is because in empirical self-consciousness we
must necessarily be able to say that it is mine. The “I” therefore, is
transcendental “I” and this is the transcendental “I” that possess the
content of consciousness that I have at the moment of my
consciousness and at the moment before. This transcendental “I” is
a necessary condition of every thought, every judgment, every idea
and thus consciousness itself. 28 What is meant by Hartnack is what
Kant calls in the first edition version Transcendental Apperception.
The same opinion but in different perspective Howard Caygill
interpret the “I think” as the same subject in which its manifold is
found. To be my intuition it must be related to an ‘apperceptive’ “I
think”. The “I think” itself is an act of spontaneity which does not
originate in or belong to sensibility.29 The two agree to exclude “I”
from empirical sense or from sensibility and put it in transcendental
realm. If the “I think” is consciousness itself and representation is
also regarded as mental consciousness or determination of inner
26 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 320; B 377.
27 Ibid., A 108
28 Justus Hartnack, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, 54.
29 Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell Publisher, 1995), 82.
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sense, so the “I think” and ‘representation’ are similar thing. This
seems to be not the case, for Kant relates mentality with self-
consciousness, and the “I think” is not just any thought, but a thought
directed to ‘my representation’.
However, we had better see the understanding of Ronno J.
Gennaro who assumes that there can be many ways to understand
the word “I think” and the “representation”. The former admits of
two possible interpretation: I non-consciously think and I consciously
think, while the latter can be taken as either ‘mental state’ or as
‘conscious mental state’. To him the two term employed by Kant
imply the same ambiguity, and therefore the sentence above might
be modified as follows: All of my mental states must be able to be
accompanied by a thought about them. By this way Kant might be
claiming that all of his mental states might become an object of his
thought. So, any of our non-consciousness mental states might
become the object of our thought or as Gennaro calls it “meta-
psychological thought”. Our mental states could become conscious
if accompanied by the appropriate meta-psychological thought.
Therefore, says Gennaro, the closest interpretation to the theory of
consciousness is that “I think” should be read as “I non-consciously
think” and ‘representation’ should be understood as “conscious
mental state”.30 But he does not merely assert “I think”, but “I think”
can be attached to each of my mental contents.
However, in connection with different object, such my self,
Paton understands the “I think” like an empirical ability of knowing.
To him my own existence or self is known only as an act of thinking
and even it is known only as a form of thought. But “I think” cannot
be proposition to infer the “I am”, because they are identical and
knowing my existence through “I think” is completely indeterminate.
I can know my own existence, not as a thinking subject in abstraction,
but only as thinking this and that concretely in a temporal succession.
If so then (granting that time is a form of my sensibility) I can know
my existence determinately only as I appear to myself in time, and
not as I am in myself.31
30 Rocco J. Gennaro, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, 49-51.
31 Paton, H.J. Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience, Vol. 2, (London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., N.Y), 401-402.
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If we admit that the “I think” is in fact what Kant calls in the
first edition version as Transcendental Apperception and the
“representation” includes all the elements of his account of
knowledge and experience, we would arrive at what is termed by
Kant as transcendental unity of self-consciousness. With the idea of
apperception, which is the unity of self-consciousness, Kant adopts
the “I think” as the absolutely first principle of all philosophical
speculation.
Now we shall elucidate the term unity of consciousness in brief.
According to Kant thoughts do not lie in the mind as an unconnected
contents, they are bond together as the thought of one mind. They
are all my thoughts, and only mine in transcendental sense. However,
looking further Kant’s notion on the unity of consciousness we will
find that it is not merely a matter of association of ideas. The unity of
consciousness entails the association of the content of consciousness
and not two equal things. Kant claims that if a manifold of
representation are bound up in one consciousness, then it follow
that they are related to one another by association. However, he denies
that the perception or concept may stand in associative relations
without being of the same consciousness. Thus the idea of bread
brings with it the idea of butter and pepper reminds us to the idea of
salt. Similarly the image of the face of a friend calls to mind the ideas
of his dress, his physical stature, his personal characteristics and his
action in the past. All these image are associated in and constitute
“the unity of consciousness”.32 In addition, there is an obvious
question on how different experience is possible to oneself. Kant
explanation on the necessary of synthesis seem to be the appropriate
answer. In order a series of experience to belong to a single
consciousness they should possess precisely the rule that govern their
connectedness. In other word, the unity of consciousness require
me to synthesize my different sensory experience in conformity with
the rule embodied in the categories. According to Paul Guyer
connection among our representation which is independent of
empirical content connection presuppose a synthesis of its diverse
element. Here the transcendental synthesis of all possible item of
consciousness independent of all ordinary empirical cognition is
32 Robert P.Wolf, “A reconstruction of the Argument of the Subjective Deduction”,
in Robert Paul Wolff, Kant, A Collection of Critical Essays, (London: Macmillan, 1968), 90-92.
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necessary. The unity of all representation in one consciousness which
is independent of their empirical content has to be grounded in an a
priori synthesis that proceed according to a priori rule.33 Thus, by
way of a priori synthetic different experiences is possible for oneself.
From this way of looking at the foregoing exposition we can
discern that the “I think” which enable such judgment to take place
can be described as “a representation” which must be capable of
accompanying all other representation. Since the representation “I
think” is a representation that must be accompanied by all other
representations and cannot be accompanied by any other
representation, it necessarily be one and the same. The point that
Kant wants to propose is that the unity of consciousness requires
self-consciousness, and self-consciousness, in turn requires the ability
to ascribe one’s mental states to oneself. This spontaneous act of mind
is called pure apperception or original apperception and the principle
that governs the unity of consciousness is entitled the Transcendental
Unity of Apperception.34
Conclusion
The foregoing delineation is preliminary attempt to depict Kant’s
argument on his renown concept namely Transcendent Unity of
Apperception. The concept is an attempt to resolve the question of
how human understanding conform or grasp an intelligible world
or in other words how the a priori knowledge of an intelligible world
would be possible. To solve this he introducses the notion of
transcendent, which is an a priori condition for the possibility of
intelligible experience. The process named transcendental deduction
is deduction of a priori knowledge by relating subject and object in
so intricate way that the unintelligible character of the whole as
essential fact is attained. In this transcendental deduction there is
another operation namely apperceptionin which human abilities
such as apprehension, reproduction, and recognition are applied to
non-empirical knowledge. Thus the general feature is to move from
what is true empirically of our knowledge to what is true
transcendentally. Therefore the self attained knowledge by way of
33 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claim of Knowledge, (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1987),  135
30 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 132.
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apperception is not as it is but only as it appears, because in
apperception we are conscious only the necessary synthetic unity of
thought. This spontaneous act of mind is called pure apperception or
original apperception, while the principle that governs the unity of
consciousness is entitled the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. In
his solution Kant propose to posit that the object-related and subject-
related phenomena should be taken to be mutually dependent and
ultimately inseparable.
However, the fact is that the intelligible worldis independent
of the human understanding and of the sensible world. The
intelligible world which is independent of our understanding cannot
be grasp except by sensibility which means that our knowledge of it
could not be a priori. The pure understanding alone could at best
enable us to form representations of an intelligible world,but since
these intellectual representations would entirely “depend on our inner
activity,” there is no good reason to believe that they conform to an
independent intelligible world. Such a priori intellectual re-
presentations could be an illusion of the brain that do not correspond
to anything independent of the human mind. Finally we may also
question what is the role of human belief during their process of
grasping the intelligible world.[]
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